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Introduction
At present, right-wing extremism seems a really marginal phenomenon in the
Netherlands. Only three or four political parties may belong to this political family, if we
define it broadly as a combination of nationalism, racism and xenophobia.
1 None of them is
represented at the national parliament or even at a provincial parliament; and only two of
them hold a seat in a municipal parliament. Together they count probably less than 1000
members, at present.
How to explain this? Is it the electoral system that prevents the rise of new parties, as
in Britain? No: the Dutch system is extremely kind to newcomers; merely 0.7 of the popular
vote suffices to win a seat in parliament. Are there no immigrants or refugees in the
Netherlands? Yes there are; more than 40,000 refugees, and almost 40,000 legal immigrants
(and an unknown number of illegal immigrants) arriving each year.
2 I suggest we have to use
a more historical approach to explain the relative failure of right-wing extremist organisations
in this country. Therefore, I will present here the history of the Extreme Right in the
Netherlands; and I will do so from three angles: organisational development, ideology and
electoral support.
1.  The Roots of the Extreme Right in the Netherlands
The Extreme Right has always been weak and fragmented in the Netherlands. It lacked an
ideological tradition as well as a solid social base. A landowning aristocracy no longer played
a significant role in Dutch politics in the nineteenth century – power had shifted to a patrician
bourgeoisie already in the Dutch Republic (1588-1795). Moreover, the Dutch did not have to
deal with a national question that could have given rise to a nationalist movement with
extremist tendencies. It is true, reactionary anti-democratic forces did emerge in the late
nineteenth century, but they were divided between Liberal, Catholic and Calvinist parties.
Only has survived until today, the Reformed State Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij ,
SGP). This party has come to accept democracy in practice, but not in theory. It would like to
replace universal suffrage by ‘organic suffrage’, i.e. give the right to vote only to (male)
heads of households.
3 However, it is not a nationalist, racist or xenophobic party.
4 Since 1925
it has occupied two or three seats in parliament.
In the 1930s, two extreme right-wing parties entered parliament: in 1933 the
conservative Association for National Reconstruction (Verbond Nationaal Herstel), in 1937
the National Socialist Movement (Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging); the former won 0.8
percent of the popular vote, the latter 4.2 per cent. The National-Socialists had already peaked
by then and began to decline – until they were saved, temporarily, by the German occupation
in 1940.
5
By 1945, national-socialism and fascism had become dirty words, of course; but so
had nationalism, conservatism and even the term ‘right-wing’. During the 1960s, a populist
right-wing Farmers’ Party (Boerenpartij) made a temporary breakthrough but failed to
consolidate its organisation as well as to articulate a coherent ideology.
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[This by way of historical introduction. Now I will present the history of contemporary
organisations: NVU, CP/CP’86 and CD – see Figure 1, Family Tree]
2.  The Dutch People’s Union
In 1977 a nationalist party, the Dutch People’s Union (Nederlandse Volksunie, NVU),
took part in parliamentary elections and almost won a seat. When it was founded in 1971, its
main purpose was to unite the Netherlands and Flanders in a Greater Dutch State. The regime
of this state should be fairly authoritarian and corporatist: the head of state should appoint a
prime minister who would not depend on parliamentary support; and parliament should be
elected at least in part by professional organisations.
7 Former members of the (banned)
National Socialist Movement and SS-volunteers had joined the NVU but kept a low profile, at3
first. Within a few years, however, the NVU turned into a racist and almost openly national-
socialist party. In 1974 the Board of Directors appointed a new leader, Joop Glimmerveen,
after he had almost won a seat in the municipal council of The Hague with the slogan ‘The
Hague should remain white and safe’.
8 He made no secret of his national-socialist
sympathies.
9 In 1977, Glimmerveen led the party in parliamentary elections with the slogan
‘Keep the Netherlands white’ and won 0.4% of the popular vote – not quite enough for a seat
(see Table 1). The NVU attracted most support in poor urban areas with a high proportion of
immigrants from countries like Surinam, Morocco or Turkey.
10 In 1978, the NVU was banned
by the court of The Hague, because its activities clashed with ‘public order and morality’.
11
Though the Supreme Court qualified this decision a year later and dissolution of the party
turned out to be impossible because of a formality, electoral participation became very
difficult for the NVU. Internal quarrels weakened it further. By the mid-eighties, the
organisation appeared dead for all practical purposes. Even the very active members of its
youth organisation joined other groups, such as the Centre Party ’86 (see below), or the
Action Front National Socialists (Aktiefront Nationale Socialisten, ANS); the latter was
founded in 1984 (as an informal organisation) by supporters of the German Neo-Nazi Michael
Kühnen.
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Yet all of a sudden in 1996, the aging Glimmerveen decided to revive the dormant
NVU, with the help of some of his young friends. Co-operating closely with the ANS, they
have organized (illegal) demonstrations in several Dutch cities, for example in August 2000
in Echt (Limburg), in order to commemorate the death of Rudolf Hess.
13 Moreover,
Glimmerveen presented himself at municipal elections at The Hague in 1998, without success
however. So did his young friend Constant Kusters, secretary of the NVU, in Arnhem.
14 The
NVU seems to maintain contacts with other Neo-Nazi organisations in Europe.
15 In 1999,
Glimmerveen was sentenced to five months in prison for inciting people to hatred and
discrimination of minorities.
3.  The Centre Party
For many nationalists, the NVU had already become too radical by the late seventies.
They tried to set up more moderate organisations, of which only the Centre Party
(Centrumpartij,CP), proved relatively successful. It was founded in 1980 and entered
parliament in 1982 (see Table 1). As the name implied, the Centre Party claimed to belong in
the centre of the political spectrum and to reject any extremist or anti-democratic tendencies.
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Its main purpose was the ‘preservation of Dutch culture’ and promotion of ‘likeminded-
ness’(eensgezindheid).
17 Unlike the NVU, it did not favour an authoritarian regime, but the
contrary: a more democratic regime, where parliamentary democracy would be combined
with direct democracy, i.e. referendum and people’s initiatives. Its socio-economic
programme could be considered moderately conservative: while accepting the welfare state,
the CP wanted to reduce the civil service and restrict the role of the state. The party was also
conservative with respect to law and order issues, but quite progressive in its emphasis on
environmental policies and animal welfare. Immigration policy did not figure prominently in
the first party programme, but the CP did focus on this theme in its election campaigns in
1981 and 1982. All in all, the party programme could hardly be called extremist.
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Nonetheless the CP was identified with the Extreme Right by most observers,
journalists and academics alike. Hans Janmaat, a political scientist who soon became
president of the party and represented it in parliament, was decried as a ‘wolf in sheep’s
clothing’ who tried to hide his fascist intentions behind a democratic façade.
19 Meetings of the
party were often disturbed, if not prevented altogether, by antifascist activists. Even so the
party grew rapidly at first, from 50 to perhaps 3000 members in its first three years, and
mobilized 135,000 voters (2.5%) at the European elections of 1984, almost enough for a seat.
It had presented a rather moderate platform at these elections, warning against the
‘internationalism’ of the established parties and emphasizing ‘Dutch identity’, but also
praising European integration and a ‘European identity’. The European Community ought to4
develop an immigration policy somewhat similar to that of the USA or Canada and to foster
remigration as well as integration of immigrants from non-European countries.
20
The electorate of the CP resembled that of the NVU. It was concentrated in larger
cities [where it obtained 5% in 1984;] and especially in districts with substantial and growing
ethnic minorities as well as high rates of unemployment. CP-voters, when interviewed by
telephone, proved much more hostile towards foreigners than average voters; as well as more
dissatisfied with their own socio-economic situation and with the political system and
politicians in the Netherlands.
21
 However, already in 1984 the party started to disintegrate. Its rapid growth and the
pressure from a hostile environment may have exacerbated ideological and personal tensions
that existed from the beginning. At a party congress in May 1984, Janmaat was replaced as
party president by Nico Konst, a history teacher and a romantic nationalist who objected to
the parliamentarism and conservatism of the member of parliament.
22 Personal ambitions,
jealousy and accusations of financial mismanagement contributed to the conflict between the
two factions. In October 1984 Janmaat was expelled from the Centre Party, while retaining
his seat in parliament. A month later, he founded a new party, the Centre Democrats (CD,
Centrumdemocraten) – more about this below.
4. CP’86 and its Offshoots
No longer represented in parliament, the Centre Party was deprived of government
subsidies – while also losing many members -  and soon ran into financial troubles. Moreover,
internal strife continued. When his high school threatened to fire him, Konst resigned as
president. In May 1986, the party failed to regain a seat in parliament; but it also failed
financially. As a consequence, it was reorganized and renamed Centre Party ’86 (CP’86). It
maintained some support in large cities, however, having won five seats at municipal
elections earlier in 1986 [one each in Amsterdam, Almere, Lelystad, Rotterdam and Utrecht].
It came to depend on assistance from the German NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschlands), which helped to print the party journal and inspired its programme.
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By 1989, the party seemed about to disappear, even lacking resources to take part in
the (anticipated) parliamentary elections of that year. Yet the next year it received fresh blood
from the Youth Front of the Netherlands, a youth organisation affiliated with the NVU, which
was about to be banned. The Youth Front leader, Stewart Mordaunt, was nominated by the
CP’86 and elected to the municipal council of The Hague in 1990. In this year the CP’86 won
four seats altogether at the municipal elections. The new members were quite active – though
more in the street, holding marches and demonstrations, than in the council meetings. Even
so, at municipal elections in 1994 the party gained nine seats. It proved particularly successful
in the Rotterdam area. Here even a founding member of the ANS, Martijn Freling, became a
municipal councillor. However, not all members of the CP’86 were happy with the growing
Neo-Nazi tendencies in the party. Disappointing results at parliamentary elections in 1994
(only 0.4%, no seat) and at provincial elections in 1995 (0.1%, no seats either) may have
contributed to growing tensions between the national-socialist wing and a more democratic
ethnic or popular-nationalist wing.
The party programme of 1994 still reflected the ideology of the ethnic nationalists or
popular nationalists (volksnationalisten). They pursued the old ideal of a Greater Dutch State,
which would incorporate French and Belgian Flanders and would be free from foreigners and
ethnic minorities. It should be an ethnically and racially pure, but democratic state. Like its
predecessor (the CP), the CP’86 advocated direct democracy, and specifically a ‘people’s
referendum’ in which only Dutch people would be allowed to participate. And the party made
it quite clear: ‘one becomes a Dutchman by birth and not by some administrative measure’.
24
Its racism remained usually implicit. It did not imply a belief in superiority of a particular
race, but the idea that a ‘multi-racial society’ lacks cohesion and stability.
25 The ardent
nationalists rejected the ‘coca-cola and hamburger culture’ and its producer, international
capitalism. They would prefer a ‘third way’ beyond capitalism and socialism, but failed to5
operationalize this ideal. In fact, they seemed resigned to accept the dominant economic
system because they did not perceive an alternative.
26 Compared to the CP, however, the
socio-economic discourse of the CP’86 had become more leftist, whereas its ideas about
immigrants could be considered more right-wing and racist.
In 1996 the volksnationalisten lost the struggle against the Neo-Nazi wing and
decided to leave the CP’86. Most of them set up a new organisation, Popular Nationalists of
the Netherlands (Volksnationalisten Nederland, VNN). In March 1998, the VNN participated
in municipal elections in four cities, without any success however. In October 1998 its
members decided to dissolve the VNN and found again a new organisation, the New National
Party (NNP), to which also some members from the CD adhered. By 2000, the NNP claimed
500 members – though 200 seems more realistic – and to be ready for national elections.
27
The leader of the Vlaams Blok, Filip de Winter, addressed its party conference in April. The
NNP has tried to mobilize popular discontent about refugee centres in several smaller cities,
by distributing leaflets there against the ‘multi-cultural’ and ‘multi-criminal’society. While its
president and vice-president were former CP’86-leaders (Egbert Perée and Henk Ruitenberg
respectively), its secretary and part of its cadre consisted of younger people, recently recruited
– often through internet. The programme of the NNP resembled that of the CP’86 in
substance, though it seems more cautious in some ways.
28
However, not all moderate members from CP’86 had joined the NNP; some had
given up on party politics and preferred to join the nationalist pressure group Outpost
(Voorpost). A Dutch branch of this originally Flemish movement was established in 1977 but
kept a low profile until 1996. Since then, it has organized seminars and summer camps, set up
a nationalist student association (Nederlandse Studentenvereniging,  since 1999 called
National Action Platform for Nationalist Students, Landelijk Actieplatform voor
Nationalistische Studenten) and published a journal for right-wing intellectuals.
29 Thus it
hopes to create a nationalist sub-culture in the Netherlands – and in the long run, a Greater
Dutch State which would incorporate Belgian and French Flanders.
Meanwhile, the CP’86 (now led by Mordaunt and Freling) had been declared a
‘criminal organisation’ by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in 1997 and was thereupon
banned and dissolved by a lower court in 1998, because it promoted discrimination of
foreigners in its programmes and propaganda and endangered the public order. The fact that it
was regarded as a criminal organisation implied that its leaders would not be allowed to found
a new party on similar principles. Both Mordaunt – convicted in 1998 for promoting
discrimination and violence at a party meeting in 1996 – and Freling seemed to have ceased
political activities, but rank-and-file members may have joined the NVU (as Kusters did
earlier) or ANS.
5.  The Centre Democrats
While the CP’86 fell apart and disappeared, its moderate rival, the Centre Democrats,
experienced ups and downs as well. More than the CP and CP’86 it focussed on the issue of
immigrants and ethnic minorities, almost like a single-issue party. Like the CP in its first
years, it embraced state nationalism, rather than ethnic nationalism.
30 ‘Preservation and
development of the political and cultural identity of the Netherlands and promotion of
national solidarity’ constituted its main principle.
31 How this should be achieved remained a
little vague, even in election platforms which tend to be rather specific. The CD rejected the
multi-cultural society in principle and would like to confront immigrants with a clear choice:
either assimilation or remigration. Yet even its rejection of multi-culturalism is not perfectly
clear and consistent. In its 1998 programme, the party suggested ‘amalgamation’ of elements
from different cultures, provided the elements from (ethnic) minorities would not clash with
essential elements of Dutch culture.
32 This rather moderate position seems hard to reconcile
with the ethnocentric and xenophobic statements in the programme and party journals of the
CD. In almost every area, housing, health care, welfare, employment, the Centre Democrats
perceived that foreigners received preferential treatment, while Dutch citizens were6
discriminated against. This ‘Anti-Dutchman-Policy’(Anti-Nederlander Beleid) should stop,
and be reversed: it was time to give prefential treatment to Dutch citizens in every area. Apart
from these ethnocentric demands, the programme of the CD contained rather moderate,
though often trivial propositions for lower fuel prices, protection of animals, re-introduction
of the death penalty and so on. Though the party often voiced populist criticisms of the
prevailing political regime – a ’democratic dictatorship’ according to Janmaat – it advocated
only modest reforms, like introduction of a referendum (which all leftwing parties in the
Netherlands favoured also) and election of a non-partisan chairman in both houses of
parliament.
33 Like the CP, the CD favoured conservative social and economic policies. The
party also accepted European integration, though it expressed some reservations about
monetary integration in its 1998 programme.
34
The CD concentrated on elections, rather than direct actions in the streets. Yet it did
not very well at municipal and national elections in 1986, nor at provincial elections in 1987.
Only in 1989 a breakthrough occurred: Janmaat regained a seat in parliament, no doubt
benefitting from the fact that the CP’86 did not take part in these elections (see Table 1).
During the next five years, electoral fortune smiled on the Centre Democrats. In March 1990
the party won 11 seats at municipal elections, in March 1991 it captured three seats at
provincial elections, in March 1994 it raised its number of municipal council seats to 77 and
gained three seats in parliament. Rising numbers of refugees and the incomplete integration of
ethnic minorities had begun to worry even the leader of the Liberal Party and a large share of
the electorate as well; in 1994, more than half of the voters sampled in a survey regarded this
as the most urgent political problem at the time.
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In national election studies, CD-voters tended to be under-represented. However,
analysis of aggregate data, local surveys and accumulation of data from the Netherlands
Institute of Public Opinion (NIPO) show a fairly consistent pattern. Like the Centre Party, the
CD attracted mainly male voters from larger cities, and especially (though not exclusively)
from areas where ethnic minorities – and especially Islamic minorities – were concentrated
and growing. Moreover, a vote for the CD correlated significantly with a low level of
education, a low income, unemployment and dependence on welfare or social security; and
with secularity and feelings of social isolation.
36 The electorate changed somewhat during the
nineties, however: more inhabitants of small cities and church members began to vote for the
CD, though still not quite as much as people in larger cities and seculars. Also the gap
between the genders and between provinces diminished without disappearing: women and
people in the northern and eastern provinces remained more reluctant to support the CD than
the average Dutch voter. Eisinga and his associates interpret these findings as a confirmation
of two theories: the theory of economic interests and the theory of symbolic interests.
37 In
other words, most CD-voters were ‘social victims’, who felt they had to compete with
immigrants for jobs, housing and welfare, while established parties devoted more attention to
the newcomers than to them. And moreover, they felt isolated and alienated from society and
the political system.
This may also explain why support for the CD declined after 1994, when economic
conditions improved in the Netherlands. Yet this was not the only factor. The CD failed to
consolidate its electoral gains. Janmaat ran the party with his wife (who was party secretary)
and step-son (who managed the party office) almost like a family business. His leadership
style alienated party cadre, especially the more ambitious and competent members. Thus in
1993 Wim Vreeswijk, one of the three provincial councillors of the CD and often seen as
Janmaat’s ‘crown prince’, was expelled after he had tried to re-unite the Dutch extreme right
in a new organisation, the Dutch Bloc (Nederlands Blok) – inspired by its Flemish
counterpart, of course. As a result, the Dutch Bloc became another rival on the political scene,
even if it has competed only in provincial and municipal elections so far.
38 Even more
substantial defections took place between 1994 and 1998. Many of the newly elected
municipal councillors failed to cope with the climate of mutual suspicion and distrust within
the party and its hostile environment. Publications about racist statements and criminal
activities of party cadre by three journalists, who had independently of each other joined the
party ‘under cover’,  caused considerable damage to the image of the party and to the7
atmosphere within its ranks.
39 By the end of 1996, almost half of the 77 municipal councillors
had either given up their seat or left the party or both.
40 Whilst the party claimed between
3000 and 4000 members in the mid-nineties, the real number must have been closer to 1000,
of which perhaps 300 could be considered active members.
41 The lack of active party cadre,
and more in particular of politically competent people, may have encouraged Janmaat to co-
operate with CP’86. In February 1996 the two parties held a demonstration together in
Zwolle, protesting against the difficulties both faced in renting facilities for party meetings. In
his speech, Janmaat promised the CD would abolish the multi-cultural society as soon as it
would have the chance and the power to do so.
42  In March 1997, he was convicted for
incitement to racial discrimination and hatred because of this speech.The sentence was
confirmed by a higher court in December 1997 and by the Supreme Court in May 1999.
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The wheel of fortune had turned again. In 1998 the CD lost 76 of its 77 municipal
seats and all three seats in parliament. As a consequence, it would not receive any more
donations from its representatives, nor state subsidies for its research office, and party
broadcasts on radio and television would end. In fact, it had to pay back subsidies it had
received earlier but could not account for. In 1999 the three provincial council seats were lost
also. Membership went down to 150, according to outside observers.
44 The party did not
cease all activities, however. In October 1999 and in July 2000 it distributed leaflets in
Kollum and Kampen, in both cases after a girl had been murdered (in Kollum possibly by a
refugee).
45 Moreover, in September 2000 it announced that it was preparing to re-enter
parliament at the next parliamentary elections (expected in 2002).
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Thus by the end of the nineties, right-wing extremism had reached another electoral
zenith in The Netherlands. It was not represented in a national or provincial parliament and
retained only two seats in a municipal council (one in Utrecht (Dutch Bloc) and one in
Schiedam (CD)), out of 10,000 municipal seats across the country.
6. Conclusions
Four conclusions can be drawn from all this, it seems to me. In the first place,
Nationalist or Right-wing Extremist organisations grow and decline in rather short cycles in
the Netherlands. The Dutch People’s Union (NVU) was founded in 1971, peaked between
1974 and 1977 and became an insignificant fringe party very soon after that. The Centre Party
was established in 1980, peaked between 1982 and 1984 and fell apart in the next three years.
One of its offshoots, the Centre Democrats, founded in 1984, has survived until today, but
passed its peak in 1994 and lost significance in 1998. Thus one might hazard a prediction: that
we are about to see another cycle of growth and decline in this decade, with probably a peak
around 2005 – either for a new party like the NNP or a revival of the CD.
The Centre Democrats are more moderate state nationalists – though some members
have made racist statements in private – whereas the New National Party adheres to a more
radical, ethnic nationalism. Yet if the NNP would manage to become a more open and
democratic party than the CD, it might attract more members and voters in the long run. Both
parties advocate a rather conservative socio-economic programme, accepting the welfare state
more or less like it is. In doing so, they may neglect the political opportunity (and electoral
potential) for a party which would combine nationalism with a libertarian critique of the
welfare state and call for drastic tax cuts, like the Progress Party in Norway and Denmark or
its offshoot, the Danish People’s Party, or even the Austrian FPO.
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A more libertarian nationalist party might be able to win middle class as well as
working class voters. So far, the nationalist parties in the Netherlands have alienated the
educated middle class. NVU, CP and CD managed to win only (some) workers and small
businessmen with little formal education as well as unemployed inhabitants of larger cities.
Most studies indicate a close conexion between sympathy for these parties and the growing
presence of ethnic minorities.
The limited electoral appeal of these parties can be attributed to four factors, in my
opinion:8
(1) the absence of a nationalist tradition in the Netherlands;
(2) the (relative) prosperity and social security of the Dutch working class and
unemployed, who constitute the potential electorate of extremist parties in post-industrial
society; there is an obvious relationship between unemployment and sympathy for right-wing
extremism;
(3) the ‘repressive tolerance’ of the Dutch state with respect to extremism, and
particularly the legal sanctions against racist statements (in a broad sense); this may
compensate for the openness of the party system (low electoral thresholds);
(4) the internal strife and incompetence of  nationalist parties and leaders – itself
partly a consequence of  the factors (1) and (3).
In the long run, these factors may change; but in the next couple of decades, Right-wing
extremism will probably remain a marginal phenomenon in the Netherlands.9
Figure 1. Family Tree of Rightwing Extremism in the Netherlands (1970-2000)
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Table 1. Election results of CD, CP/CP’86 and NVU at National and European
Elections(1977-1999)
       CP/ CP’86            CD         NVU           Total
1 Election
Votes
%
Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
1977 NE  0.4   0  1.2   1
1979 EE   -   -   -   -
1981 NE  0.1   0  0.1   0  0.5   0
1982 NE  0.9   1  0.0   0  1.2   1
1984 EE  2.5   0   -   -  2.5   0
1986 NE  0.4   0  0.1   0   -   -  0.5   0
1989 EE   -   -  0.8   0   -   -  0.8   0
1989 NE   -   -  0.9   1   -   -  1.0   1
1994 NE  0.4   0  2.5   3   -   -  3.0   3
1994 EE   -   -  1.0   0   -   -  1.0   0
1998 NE  0.6   0   -   -  0.6   0
1999 EE  0.5   0   -   -  0.5   0
                                                     
1 Total includes other parties and lists, specifically: the Farmers’Party (Boerenpartij), renamed  Right-
Wing People’s Party (Rechtse Volkspartij), in 1981 and active until 1982; the Political Federation
(Staatkundige Federatie) in 1989 and Patriotic Democratic Appeal in 1994.11
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